In Platons Dialog Sophistes wird nach der Definition des Sophisten gefragt; das führt zum Begriff des Nichtseienden und schließlich unter dem Stichwort 'Dialektik' auf die Frage nach dem Seienden. Daß Platon dabei von der sophistischen Methode ausgeht, das Seiende als bloße Spitze einer Begriffspyramide zu deuten, haben seine Interpreten seit jeher als irgendwie widersprüchlich empfunden. Dieser Kommentar ist für Leser gedacht, die bereit sind, den Sophistes genau zu studieren, aber dabei einen Begleiter haben möchten, der ihnen in möglichst direkter und (...) knapper Form hilft, den oft schwierigen einzelnen Schritten zu folgen und zugleich die Übersicht über das nicht weniger schwierige Ganze zu behalten. Er will nicht in die kaum noch überschaubare wissenschaftliche Diskussion einführen, sondern nur das dort zunehmend ins Hintertreffen geratende unmittelbare Verständnis des Wortlauts sicherstellen. Er ist "kritisch", weil er zum unbefangenen Lesen anhalten möchte. Damit wendet er sich nicht gegen die idealistische Interpretation von Platons Dialogen, der Platon seinen Ruhm als Philosoph verdankt, sondern will zeigen, daß es falsch wäre, den Platon, der im Sophistes Grundlegendes u. a. über Begriffsbildung und Sprache zu sagen hat, darüber zu vernachlässigen. (shrink)

Commentary and notes on Plato's Republic. The text of the Republic is not included.

von Gustav Adolf Seeck ; Volltext // Exemplar mit der Signatur: München, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek -- Z 50.598-31/34.

In seinem Dialog Politikos fragt Platon nach den Bedingungen, unter denen ein Staat einem politischen Ideal nahekommen kann. Es ist eine Demokratie, in der das Volk klug genug ist, sich eine Regierung zu wählen, die ihre Aufgabe völlig selbstlos nach bestem Wissen und Gewissen erfüllt. Sie muß in erster Linie verhindern, daß die Kluft zwischen den Reichen und Mächtigen und dem einfachen Volk ständig größer wird. Das Hauptproblem der Demokratie ist, einen Ausgleich zwischen der unausgegorenen Meinung der Mehrheit und dem (...) gezielten Handeln der Regierung zu finden. Platon ist pessimistisch, weil es unmöglich zu sein scheint, eine ideale Regierung zu finden, und das Volk allzu oft auf Lügner und „Betrüger“ hereinfällt. (shrink)

Originally presented as the author's thesis, Bonn, 1978.

Johannes von Kries (1853-1928) left a fascinating work: As a physiologist, he had a lasting influence on research into colour perception. As a philosopher, he formulated a theory of probability which was received not only in philosophy (Hans Reichenbach, Ludwig Wittgenstein), but also in physics (Ludwig Boltzmann, Max Planck), jurisprudence (Gustav Radbruch), sociology (Alfred Schütz, Max Weber), economics (John Maynard Keynes), and belles-lettres (Robert Musil). This anthology reconstructs some central lines of reception. It contexts Kries' work in the history (...) of ideas and examines its topicality. --Page 4 cover. (shrink)

The eminent philosopher of science Carl G. Hempel, Stuart Professor of Philosophy at Princeton University and a Past President of the American Philosophical Association, has had a long and distinguished academic career in the course of which he has been professorial mentor to some of America's most distinguished philosophers. This volume gathers together twelve original papers by Hempel's students and associates into a volume intended to do homage to Hempel on the occasion of his 65th year in 1970. The papers (...) are grouped around the unifying topic of Hempel's own interests in logic and philosophy of science, the great majority dealing with issues on inductive logic and the theory of scientific explanatio- problems to which Hempel has devoted the bulk of his outstandingly fruitful efforts. With the approach of 'Peter' Hempel's 65th birthday, an editorial committee sprang into being by an uncannily spontaneous process to prepare to commemorate this event with an appropriate Festschrift. The editors were pleased to receive unfailingly prompt and efficient coopera tion on the part of all contributors. The responsibility of seeing the work through the press was assumed by Nicholas Rescher. The editors are grateful to all concerned for their collaboration. ALAN ROSS ANDERSON PAUL BENACERRAF ADOLF GRUNBAUM GERALD J. MASSEY NICHOLAS RESCHER RICHARD S. RUDNER TABLE OF CONTENTS PREFACE V PAUL OPPENHEIM: Reminiscences of Peter 1 w. v. QUINE: Natural Kinds 5 JAAKKO HINTIKKA: Inductive Independence and the Paradoxes of Confirmation 24 WESLEY c. (shrink)

Husserl has undoubtedly considered himself being influenced by Brentano, but his conflicts with the orthodox core of the School of Brentano raise the question whether his adherence to Brentano suffices to adequately grasp the context of his early philosophy. I investigate the biographical details of Husserl’s studies in Vienna to uncover hitherto unknown ties between Husserl and Austrian philosophers outside the School of Brentano. Already during his secondary school studies in the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy Husserl was exposed to the philosophy textbooks (...) of Gustav Adolf Lindner; and archival records of the University of Vienna show that he had extensively attended philosophy courses held by other philosophers, especially by Robert Zimmermann. Both Lindner and Zimmermann proposed Herbartian philosophies, and what makes Zimmermann especially interesting is that he had once been a close personal disciple of Bernard Bolzano. I use an unpublished lecture transcript, written by a fellow student of Husserl, to investigate the controversial issue of Zimmermann’s possible transmission of Bolzano’s ideas. While a direct transmission seems improbable, my investigation uncovers a plethora of Herbartian influences, which are interesting on their own terms and have not only furnished Husserl with important parts of his descriptive psychological toolbox but have also helped him navigate the Brentano-School’s debate on intentionality. (shrink)

This short note deals with an epigram preserved by the Anthologia Palatina Book IX (360) attributed to a Metrodorus whom, especially for chronological reasons, one tends to identify with the Epicurean Metrodorus of Lampsacus, at least from the Phoinix von Kolophon by Gustav Adolph Gerhard (1909). This epigram looks like a “symmetrical” polemical reply to the immediately preceding one (AP IX 359), which can be attributed (but not without difficulty) to the Hellenistic poet Posidippus. The careful historical-philosophical examination (...) of the contents of this alleged Epicurean epigram (360) leads to believe that it is basically impossible that the author is an Epicurean philosopher such as Metrodorus. (shrink)

It is argued here that cognitive science currently neglects an important source of insight into the human mind: the effects created by magicians. Over the centuries, magicians have learned how to perform acts that are perceived as defying the laws of nature, and that induce a strong sense of wonder. This article argues that the time has come to examine the scientific bases behind such phenomena, and to create a science of magic linked to relevant areas of cognitive science. Concrete (...) examples are taken from three areas of magic: the ability to control attention, to distort perception, and to influence choice. It is shown how such knowledge can help develop new tools and indicate new avenues of research into human perception and cognition. (shrink)

Magicians use misdirection to prevent you from realizing the methods used to create a magical effect, thereby allowing you to experience an apparently impossible event. Magicians have acquired much knowledge about misdirection, and have suggested several taxonomies of misdirection. These describe many of the fundamental principles in misdirection, focusing on how misdirection is achieved by magicians. In this article we review the strengths and weaknesses of past taxonomies, and argue that a more natural way of making sense of misdirection is (...) to focus on the perceptual and cognitive mechanisms involved. Our psychologically-based taxonomy has three basic categories, corresponding to the types of psychological mechanisms affected: perception, memory, and reasoning. Each of these categories is then divided into subcategories based on the mechanisms that control these effects. This new taxonomy can help organize magicians' knowledge of misdirection in a meaningful way, and facilitate the dialog between magicians and scientists. (shrink)

It’s often claimed that some people—fundamentalists or fanatics—are indeed sealed off from rational criticism. And every month new pop psychology books appear, describing the dumb ways ordinary people make decisions, as revealed by psychological experiments. The conclusion is that all or most people are fundamentally irrational. -/- Ray Scott Percival sets out to demolish the whole notion of the closed mind and of human irrationality. There is a difference between making mistakes and being irrational. Though humans are prone to mistakes, (...) they remain rational. In fact, making mistakes is a sign of rationality: a totally non-rational entity could not make a mistake. -/- Rationality does not mean absence of error; it means the possibility of correcting error in the light of criticism. In this sense, all human beliefs are rational: they are all vulnerable to being abandoned when shown to be faulty. -/- Percival agrees that people cling stubbornly to their beliefs, but he maintains, first, that not being too ready to abandon one’s beliefs is rational, and second, that people do not cling to their beliefs indefinitely or “come what may.” The illusion that they do can be dispelled by examining what really goes on in the formation and abandonment of beliefs, and here we need to observe the high rate of turnover in membership of ideological movements, as well as their numerous splits and schisms. -/- Percival examines and refutes the arguments of writers who have upheld the Irrationality or Closed Mind thesis, including Raymond Boudon, Serge Chakotin, Richard Dawkins, Jon Elster, Ernest Gellner, Adolf Hitler, Leszek Kolakowski, Walter Laqueur, Gustav Le Bon, Karl Popper, and Max Weber. -/- A key aspect of Percival’s approach is to identify “the persuader’s predicament,” the situational logic of the propagandist. Percival contends that a propagandist is faced with a trade-off between his message being closed to criticism and the message reaching and converting as many people as possible. It is possible to make a belief system more closed to criticism, but only by limiting the wide dissemination of the system. Percival illustrates the way belief systems adapt to criticism by an examination of two ideologies, Marxism and Freudianism, and by various examples drawn from the history of religion. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that the German morphological tradition made a major contribution to twentieth-century study of form. Several scientists paved the way for this research: paleontologist Adolf Seilacher, entomologist Hermann Weber, and biologist Johann-Gerhard Helmcke together with architect Frei Otto. All of them sought to examine morphogenetic processes to illustrate their inherent structural properties, thus challenging the neo-Darwinian framework of evolutionary theory. I point out that the German theoretical challenge to adaptationist thinking was possible through an (...) exchange and transfer of practices, data, technologies, and knowledge between biologically oriented students of form and architects, designers, and engineers. This exchange of practices and knowledge was facilitated by the establishment of two collaborative research centers at the beginning of the 1970s. Hence, by showing the richness of topics, methods, and technologies discussed in German-speaking morphology between 1950 and the 1970s, this paper paves the way to a much broader comprehension of the shifts that have shaped twentieth-century evolutionary biology. (shrink)

"Well over one half of this brilliant new Monograph constitutes a major sequel to Professor Grunbaum's highly influential 1984 book The Foundations of Psychoanalysis: A Philosophical Critique, which was labeled "magisterial" by Frank J. Sulloway, and "the most important book ever written on Freud's status as a scientist" by J. Allan Hobson. The importance of the present Monograph lies in the extent to which the author now goes beyond that earlier volume to offer new original ideas on fundamental themes." "Validation (...) in the Clinical Theory of Psycho-analysis: A Study in the Philosophy of Psycho-analysis contains Adolf Grunbaum's new basic critique of the psychoanalytic theory of transference in its role of an etiologic theory; it turns out that etiologic transference interpretations rest on fallacious causal inferences from so-called "meaning connections" between mental states: moreover, just these unsound inferences are the stock-in-trade of the "hermeneutic" reconstruction of psychoanalysis, which charges Freud with a "scientistic self-misunderstanding."" "This volume joins the issue with Marshall Edelson's defenses of the investigative viability of the single-subject case study method. As a spin-off from the import of the serious placebo challenge to psychoanalysis, this Monograph presents the author's widely recognized new account of the placebo concept across all of medicine and psychotherapy. Whereas Foundations of Psychoanalysis objected that Freud's dream theory was evidentially ill-founded, the burden of the present book is to give two new basic reasons for presuming the theory to be false. It also develops the import of the author's appraisal of psychoanalytic theory for the scrutiny of Freud's triadic psychology of religious belief in theism." "Since Sir Karl Popper's most detailed charge of pseudoscience against psychoanalysis in 1983 could not be examined for inclusion in the 1984 book, the present monograph shows in what ways it is wide of the mark as an incoherent diagnosis of the scientific liabilities of psychoanalytic theory. In addition, four important papers that had antedated Foundations by a few years and were scattered over diverse publications have been updated and integrated with the other chapters herein."--BOOK JACKET.Title Summary field provided by Blackwell North America, Inc. All Rights Reserved. (shrink)

It is well known that the process of scientific inquiry, according to Peirce, is drivenby three types of inference, namely abduction, deduction, and induction. What isbehind these labels is, however, not so clear. In particular, the common identificationof abduction with Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE) begs the question,since IBE appears to be covered by Peirce's concept of induction, not that of abduction.Consequently, abduction ought to be distinguished from IBE, at least on Peirce's account. The main aim of the paper, (...) however, is to show that this distinction is most relevant with respect to current problems in philosophy of science and epistemology (like attempts to supply suitable notions of realism and truth as well as related concepts like coherence and unification). In particular, I also try to show that (and in what way) Peirce's inferential triad can function as a method that ensures both coherence and correspondence. It is in this respect that his careful distinction between abduction and induction (or IBE) ought to be heeded. (shrink)